Essentially, Haifan Baha'is believe lying and deception are acceptable practices in order
to "protect the faith."
Wisdom and Dissimulation: The Use and Meaning of Hikmat in the Baha'i Writings and
History
Susan Stiles Maneck
The purpose of this paper is to examine a particular technical
meaning of the term wisdom' or hikmat,as that term appears both
in Bahá'í Writings and historical accounts. In many cases
hikmat calls for the apparent suspension of a Bahá'í principle
in order to ensure the protection of the Faith. This by no means
exhausts the ways in which the term hikmat appears in these
there. When Greek philosophical texts were translated into
Arabic, sophia or metaphysical truth and phronesis or prudence
were both translated using the same term hikmat for what were two
distinct Aristotelian concepts. For Aristotle sophia was the
knowledge of eternal and principles while phronesis referred to
the realm of moral and political action. Bahá'u'lláh's usage of
the term hikmat often reflects both these meaning. This paper
however, will largely confine itself to those instances where the
term seem to have reflected the meaning of phronesis.1Bahá'u'lláh
regarded the application of any of his laws as contained in the
Kitab-I-Aqdas as conditional upon the exercise of wisdom.2
Likewise the dissemination of Bahá'í writings was limited for
the same reason.3 Shoghi Effendi, while affirming
"that at the very root of the Cause lies the principle of
the undoubted right of the individual to self-expression,"
found it necessary to insist that Bahá'ís temporarily submit
their work to censors before publication as a provisional measure
"designed to guard and protect the Cause in its present
state of infancy and growth until the day when this tender and
precious plant shall have sufficiently grown to be able to
withstand the unwisdom of its friends and the attacks of its
enemies."4 Adib Taherzadeh, who has written most
extensively on Bahá'u'lláh's writings, defines the Bahá'í use
of wisdom in these terms: By wisdom is meant taking any
praiseworthy action through which the Cause of God may be
promoted. Lack of wisdom is to take actions which owing to
circumstances result in harming the Faith, even though they may
be carried out with the best possible motive.5
This definition, though by no means inaccurate, too vaguely
conveys the pragmatic usage to which this term was applied and
why and how the term "wisdom" or hikmat came to acquire
such a meaning. Observing wisdom' in practice often involved acts
which would not ordinarily be regarded as praiseworthy.' These
included: denying or misleading people regarding one's Bahá'í
identity, concealing inconvenient aspects of the Bahá'í
teachings, and compromising certain Bahá'í principles. It is my
thesis that the term "wisdom," where it refers to
behavior enjoined for protection of the Faith, has its roots deep
within Iranian theology, culture and history. Its usage is not
dissimilar from the inscrutable Wisdom of God as depicted in
Persian religion as far back as Zoroastrianism. It ties in as
well to Iranian conventions of etiquette (ta'aruf). Further,
hikmat serves a function not dissimilar to the role played by
taqiyyih or dissimulation in Shi'ite Islam.
Wisdom and Persian Cultural Norms
Persian etiquette, or ta'aruf, involves the concealment and
control of one's personal feelings or opinions in service of
smooth public interactions. At times this may amount to no more
than refusing refreshments when initially offered no matter how
hungry the person may be; at other times it involves much more
complex social interactions where relative status is determined.
Iranians often tend to reserve access to their inner self to a
small circle of intimates. Among these persons, interactions
ought to be pure and constant, maintaining a spiritual integrity.
With those outside that circle one behaves with reserve and
formality, concealing one's true intentions. Westerners often
interpret this behavior as hypocritical. When ta'aruf is combined
with a market place shrewdness, zerangi, which is often marked by
a lack of social responsibility, this negative impression is
further reinforced.6 Iranians deem such behavior as
courteous, prudent, and necessary when dealing with an uncertain
and treacherous world. Far from being cynical and insincere, they
see themselves as simply conducting themselves with wisdom. As
was mentioned earlier, hikmat served a function within the early
Iranian Bahá'í community very similar to the role of taqiyyih
or dissimulation in Shi'ite Islam. Taqiyyih refers to the
practice concealing one's belief in order to avoid persecution.
Such behavior is condoned, and even required of Shi'ites who
frequently lived among a hostile Sunni majority. The Qur'anic
verse condemning apostasy but which adds the words "except
for those who are compelled while their hearts are firm in
faith" is used to justify this practice.7 As in
ta'aruf, a distinction is made between outward behavior and inner
conviction. Taqiyyih might involve nothing more than assuming
prayer positions of Sunni Muslims while performing obligatory
prayers publicly or it might entail an actual denial of one's
faith. During the medieval period of Islamic history taqiyyih
came to be practiced by philosophers and mystics as well as
Shi'ites in order to protect themselves against persecution on
the part of the more bigoted ulama. Such an approach was
encouraged by even the great Sunni theologian al-Ghazali, who
argued for what the renowned historian of Islam, Marshall
Hodgson, has described as a "pattern of gradation and
concealment of knowledge."8Ordinary believers
were not to be given access to certain types of religious
knowledge lest they misunderstand it and stumble as a result.
Likewise Avicenna, the greatest of Islamic Aristotileans, would
in his capacity as a qadi, or Islamic judge, condemn those who
too freely popularized the teachings of Aristotle. Sufis likewise
critized al-Hallaj, the famous mystic who was crucified for
asserting "I am the truth," not because the sentiment
was heretical in itself but because al-Hallaj was revealing
secrets' which might incline the common people towards blasphemy.
Knowledge in the Islamic world came to be divided into exoteric
and esoteric categories. The exoteric knowledge was accessible to
all Muslims and tended to be conceived in unambiquous black and
white terms. Esoteric knowledge required initiation and works
containing such knowledge tended to be worded in such a way as to
be unintelligible to those not already familiar with its
mysteries. As Marshall Hodgson points out: When all dissenting
statements were cast in esoteric form, explicitly acknowledging
the correctness of the received exoteric doctrines . . . it
became easy to find excuses for doubt about a dissenter. No one
denied the official positions; the question was simply whether
what else a person said did in fact contradict those positions.
But if writing was done with sufficient obscurity, guilt could
never be proved beyond a reasonable doubt.9
While this approach allowed for much more intellectual
diversity to exist within the Islamic World than was possible in
Christendom at the time, there was a price to be paid for
dissumulation. The Muslim intellegentsia, in making themselves
incomprehensible to the common people, sacrificed any hope of
changing the direction of the community as a whole.
Wisdom in the Writings of Bahá'u'lláh
While dissimulation was condemned in Bahá'u'lláh's writings,
many aspects of the practice persisted under the name of hikmat.
Bahá'u'lláh wrote: In this Day, We can neither approve the
conduct of the fearful that seeketh to dissemble his faith, nor
sanction the behaviour of the avowed believer that clamourously
asserteth his allegiance to this Cause. Both should observe the
dictates of wisdom, and strive diligently to serve the best
interests of the Faith.10
In the Tablet of Medicine as well as the Tablet of the Proof
Bahá'u'lláh pairs wisdom with eloquence or explication (hikmat
va bayan), implying that one should proclaim the Cause
discretely. In the case of the Tablet of the Proof Bahá'u'lláh
insisted that the believers exercise wisdom by not protesting
their mistreatment at the hands of the authorities: To none is
given the right to protest against anyone concerning that which
hath befallen the Cause of God. It behoveth whosoever hath set
his face towards the Most Sublime Horizon to cleave tenaciously
unto the cord of patience, to put his reliance in God, the Help
in Peril, the Unconstrained. O ye loved ones of God! Drink your
fill from the wellspring of wisdom, and walk ye in the garden of
wisdom, and speak forth with wisdom and eloquence. Thus biddeth
you your Lord, the Almighty, the All-knowing.11
The injunction to observe wisdom' was due to the dangerous
situation in which Bahá'ís in Iran found themselves. In the
Tablet of Medicine, Bahá'u'lláh states that the purpose of
hikmat is the protection of the friends in order that they may
remain within the world to make mention of the Lord of all
worlds.12 Most commonly hikmat involved presenting the
Faith to non-believers in ways which avoided controversy and
insured a positive reception. In Bahá'u'lláh's words, Fix your
gaze upon wisdom in all things, for it is an unfailing antidote.
How often hath it turned a disbeliever into a believer or a foe
into a friend? It observance is highly essential, inasmuch as
this hath been set forth in numerous Tablets revealed from the
empyrean of the Will of Him Who is the Manifestation of the light
of divine unity. Well is it with them that act accordingly.13
At times even the Lawh-I-Hikmat, in which text hikmat usually
refers to Greek philosophy, Bahá'u'lláh has this meaning in
mind, Say: Human utterance is an essence which aspireth to exert
its influence and needeth moderation. . . . As to its moderation,
this has to be combined with tact and wisdom as prescribed in the
Holy Scriptures and Tablets.14
An instance where Bahá'u'lláh Himself exercises this kind of
wisdom can be seen in a Tablet addressed to Mirza Abu'l-Fadl in
answer to some questions raised by by Manakji, a Parsi for whom
Abu'l-Fadl worked. Manakji had asked how it could be, if all
religions came from God, that they all had different laws and
ordinances such that one forbade pork, while another prohibited
beef. Bahá'u'lláh tells him that since the answer to this
question goes against Islamic teachings, it would be contrary to
wisdom to give him a direct answer, especially since Manakji had
in his employ people of various religions who might chance upon
this letter.15 Instead Bahá'u'lláh alludes to the
Tablet of the Divine Physician where He has said that every age
has different needs and that one should examine the Bahá'í
teachings as to whether they are the remedy for today's ills.16This
perspective would have offended Muslims since they believed that
each religion began with the same teachings which only
subsequently became corrupted to be finally restored with Islam.
In order to avoid charges of heresy, Bahá'u'lláh tries to be as
discreet as possible in suggesting that the various religions
have had different laws and ordinances from the start. He alludes
to the necessity of feeding infants milk and not meat lest they
perish. To do otherwise would be wrong and and far from wisdom.
Only the Manifestation of God can determine such matters.17While
at times hikmat involved concealing one's genuine views in
situations of insecurity and possible persecution, Bahá'u'lláh
at other times spoke of it in broader terms as that sagacity of
spirit which ought to typify all of our human interactions at all
times. This seems to be the sense in which He uses it in the
following Hidden Word: O SON OF DUST! The wise are they that
speak not unless they obtain a hearing, even as the cup-bearer,
who proffereth not his cup till he findeth a seeker, and the
lover who crieth not from the depths of his heart until he gazeth
upon the beauty of his beloved. Wherefore sow the seeds of wisdom
and knowledge in the pure soil of the heart, and keep them
hidden, till the hyacinths of divine wisdom spring from the heart
and not from mire and clay.18
Wisdom within the Bahá'í Community
While Bahá'u'lláh made a clear distinction between hikmat
and taqiyyih for many of the early believers, the difference
appears to have been slight. Muhammad Tahir Malmari, in his
account of Bahá'í martyrdoms in Yazd, frequently describes
instances where believers accused of being Bahá'ís explicitly
denied that this was so. Yet when told to prove their disbelief
by cursing or condemning the religion they silently went to their
deaths, "firm and steadfast," according to Malmari.19Cursing
for a nineteenth century Iranian was conceived of as having very
real and concrete effects. This no doubt partly accounts for the
Bahá'ís' insistence at drawing a line at this point. But it
seems also that early Bahá'ís made a distinction between
denying their own identity as Bahá'ís, an act which under
duress they were willing to commit, and denying the validity of
the Faith itself, for which they were prepared to die before
doing. Responses to interrogation varied from individual.
Malmari's accounts include the case of a Bahá'í who when asked
if he was a Bábi courageously responded, No, he was a Bahá'í
and proceeded to describe the difference.20 This
behavior was more the exception than the rule, though. The
distinction Bahá'ís made between denying their identity as
Bahá'ís and denying the validity of the Bahá'í revelation is
borne out by the behavior of Jewish Bahá'ís in Hamadan during
this period. Ruhu'u'llah Mihrabkhani reports that the Jewish
Bahá'ís of Hamadan in the nineteenth century, "in order to
observe hikmat" went to the Presbyterian missionaries and
feigned conversion to Christianity. They continued to associate
themselves with the missionaries until Mirza Abu'l-Fadl visited
Hamadan and, in the course of his discussions with the mission-
aries, made it clear that the Jews had come to recognize Jesus as
the Messiah only by virtue of having accepted the message of
Bahá'u'lláh.21 Following this and similar incidents
one missionary urged others to insist that any candidate for
church membership be required to specifically deny that
Bahá'u'lláh was the "return" of the preceding prophet
in a manner analogous to the way in which Christians understood
John the Baptist to be the "return" of Elijah. The
"confession" of faith recommended for baptismal
candidates went as follows, I believe that Jesus Christ is the
Son of God; that He really died on the cross for our salvation;
that He really and truly rose from the dead, leaving behind an
empty tomb; that He alone is the Savior of the World. I deny the
doctrine of rij'at (return), by which I am to believe that Jesus
was Moses returned, and that Mohammad, the Báb and Bahá'u'lláh
were returns' of Jesus, and I declare it to be false teaching.
Accepting Jesus as my Lord and Savior I declare Mohammad, the
Báb and Bahá'u'lláh to have been false prophets and false
guides, leading men away from the truth.22
While this declaration involved no actual cursing of the Báb
or Bahá'u'lláh, missionaries felt confident that no Bahá'í
would make such a confession and they were quite correct. Denying
one's identity as a Bahá'í was the most extreme form of hikmat
practiced within the community and such behavior ceased to be
sanctioned during the ministry of Shoghi Effendi.23
Given the extreme dangers and persecutions which Bahá'ís have
faced throughout their history, that compromise and concealment
would be condoned is quite understandable. The issue remains,
though, as to why such acts were termed "wisdom?"
Divine Wisdom and Foresight
Wisdom in the Iranian context is often identified with
foresight. In Shoghi Effendi's writings in English, the word
wisdom can often be replaced with foresight without any loss of
meaning. Unwisdom is sometimes directly paired with
shortsightedness. In a letter dated November 28, 1931, for
instance, he in large part blames the Depression on the
"unwisdom and shortsightedness" of the framers of the
Versailles Peace Treaty.24 The notion of wisdom as
foresight goes back as far as Zoroastrianism, Iran's oldest
prophetic religion, where it is regarded as the chief attribute
which distinguishes God from the Evil One and insures His
ultimate victory. In Zoroastrianism, God is addressed as Ahura
Mazda, meaning Wise Lord. During the Sassanian period when
Zoroastrian thought became crystallized, Ahura Mazda was not
considered omnipotent, for His power was limited by the
independent existence of Ahriman, the Evil One. His sole
advantage over Ahriman rests in His possession of wisdom as
foresight, which Ahriman utterly lacks. When, in the
Pre-existence Ahriman insisted on making war on Ahura Mazda and
rejected Ahura Mazda's overtures of peace, Ahura Mazda tricked
Ahriman into setting a time limit on the battle, thus inventing
lineal time. Ahura Mazda with His wisdom could foresee that once
a limit was set on time, evil itself would be limited and
contained, and the victory of the forces of good would be
assured. Ahriman, unable to foresee this outcome, agreed to the
terms. Ahura Mazda then revealed to Ahriman the eventual outcome
of his folly, and Ahriman fell unconscious and remained so for
the next three thousand years, during which period Ahura Mazda
created the material world which would aid in Ahriman's eventual
destruction. Frequently Bahá'í writings refer to divine wisdom
as an act of selective concealment in order to obtain long-range
benefits. Such wisdom is embedded in the very notion of
Progressive Revelation, wherein God has revealed Himself not in
accordance with His own Being but in accordance with the capacity
of humanity to receive knowledge of Him. In The Seven Valleys
Bahá'u'lláh asserts that one who has obtained true knowledge
will apprehend "the divine wisdom in the endless
Manifestations of God" and will not be mislead by the
seemingly contradictory nature of God's activity in the world.25An
instance of such seemingly contradictory events was the
discontinuance of the institution of a living Guardian at the
death of Shoghi Effendi. According to the Will and Testament of
'Abdu'l-Bahá, the Guardian of the Cause of God had the
responsibility "to appoint in his own life-time him that
shall become his successor, that differences may not arise after
his passing . . ."26 Yet Shoghi Effendi passed
away without providing for a successor or writing a will. But as
the Universal House of Justice pointed out, at Shoghi Effendi's
death there were no potential candidates for this position, the
Guardian having been childless and his family members having died
or been expelled from the community. Consequently the House of
Justice insisted: The fact that Shoghi Effendi did not leave a
will cannot be adduced as evidence of his failure to obey
Bahá'u'lláh--rather should we acknowledge that in his very
silence there is a wisdom and a sign of his infallible guidance.27
On the issue of women's rights, divine wisdom, in the sense we
have just discussed it, and the injunction upon Bahá'ís to
observe "wisdom" in their action directly converge.
While Bahá'u'lláh unequivocally proclaimed the equality of men
and women,28'Abdu'l-Bahá, in answer to a question
regarding the exclusion of women from the Chicago House of
Justice, replied that the House of Justice, "according to
the explicit text of the Law of God, is confined to men, this for
a wisdom of the Lord God's, which will ere long be made manifest
as clearly as the sun at high noon."29 Seven
years later 'Abdu'l-Bahá ruled that this exclusion applied only
to the as yet unformed Universal House of Justice and allowed
women in America to serve on local bodies.30 When
women in Iran, however, attempted to imitate the American
Bahá'í women by discarding the veil and demanding a greater
role in Bahá'í administration, 'Abdu'l-Bahá insisted that
"nothing should be done contrary to wisdom." He further
admonished them, Ye need to be calm and composed, so that the
work will proceed with wisdom, otherwise there will be such chaos
that ye will leave everything and run away. "This newly born
babe is traversing in one night the path that needeth a hundred
years to tread." [A Persian proverb]. In brief, ye should
now engage in matters of pure spirituality and not contend with
men. 'Abdu'l-Bahá will tactfully take appropriate steps. Be
assured. In the end thou wilt thyself exclaim, "This was
indeed supreme wisdom!"31
'Abdu'l-Bahá's anxiety over the agitation of Iranian Bahá'í
women was quite understandable. Nothing would have aroused
greater antipathy from Muslims than to see Bahá'í women
uncovered and moving freely and equally among men. A women could
not consult privately on a council with men and expect to
maintain her reputation. Bahá'u'lláh Himself provided for the
progressive application of Bahá'í law for reasons of wisdom. He
stated, Indeed, the laws of God are like unto the ocean and the
children of men as fish, did they but know it. However, in
observing them one must exercise tact and wisdom... Since most
people are feeble and far removed from the purpose of God,
therefore one must observe tact and prudence under all
conditions, so that nothing might happen that could cause
disturbance and dissension or raise clamor among the headless.32
This principle has been applied by 'Abdu'l-Bahá and Shoghi
Effendi in the case of Bahá'í teachings on monogamy. The
Kitab-i Aqdas appears to allow bigamy when it states:
"Beware that ye take not unto yourselves more wives than
two."33In an untranslated letter 'Abdu'l-Bahá
gave a believer permission to take a second wife. He also
indicated that the law concerning taking no more than two wives
cannot be abrogated. He also noted that this law was conditional
upon justice which was a condition virtually impossible to
fulfill, but that 'Abdu'l-Bahá would not prevent believers from
marrying a second wife if they were certain they would act with
justice.34 Both during the ministry of Bahá'u'lláh
and 'Abdu'l-Bahá bigamy was practiced in Bahá'í communities
within the Middle East. Yet in another Tablet 'Abdu'l-Bahá
stated: Know thou that polygamy is not permitted under the law of
God, for contentment with one wife hath been clearly stipulated.
Taking a second wife is made dependent upon equity and justice
being upheld between the two wives, under all conditions.
However, observance of justice and equity towards two wives is
utterly impossible. The fact that bigamy has been made dependent
upon an impossible condition is clear proof of its absolute
prohibition. Therefore it is not permissible for a man to have
more than one wife.35
Shoghi Effendi later determined that this statement of
'Abdu'l-Bahá's would be considered normative within the Bahá'í
community.36A letter from the Research Department of
the World Centre on this topic suggests that 'Abdu'l-Bahá
"introduced the question of monogamy gradually in accordance
with the principles of wisdom and the progressive unfoldment of
His purpose."37As we have seen, the term wisdom
in Bahá'í writings whether it refers to inscrutable divine
wisdom or the caution and tact with which Bahá'ís are urged to
conduct themselves for the protection of the Faith usually
carries with it the connotation of foresight. In practice, the
word could be used within the community to refer to acts which
seemingly contradicted some of the basic principles of the Faith
but which in the long term were seen as serving its best
interest. Especially included among such acts have been the
willingness on the part of believers to deny their Bahá'í
identity under persecution, the temporary exercise of censorship,
and compromises made in regards to gender issues.
Wisdom and Scholarship
The concept of hikmat as we have just discussed it sometimes
finds itself on a collision course with another principle held
dear to Bahá'ís, the independent investigation of truth. If, in
the name of hikmat it is possible to obscure, conceal, or
compromise the Bahá'í teachings in any way, how can anyone,
Bahá'í or non-Bahá'í conduct an adequate investigation of its
validity. How can anyone be expected "to see with their own
eyes and not through the eyes of others" if others determine
what they will be allowed to examine? In recent years this issue
has acquired a certain urgency especially among Western
believers, most of whom are converts who would never have left
the religion of their fathers to become Bahá'ís had they not
already been committed in their hearts to this principle. This
issue looms especially large for Bahá'í academicians and
scholars. While the Bahá'í community in general, and the
Persian believers in particular, might wish for the Bahá'í
academic scholar to confine himself to topics which edify the
community and further the expansion of the Cause, the individual
scholar often feels that his research should only be guided by
the principle "He must so clense his heart that no remnant
of either love or hate may linger therein, lest that love blindly
incline him to error, or that hate repel him away from the
truth."38 In this connection the scholar, often
much to the dismay of some Bahá'ís, sometimes finds it most
productive to shine his light in the darkened corners. In
connection with this issue, it should be recognized that
Bahá'u'lláh laid a special burden upon the learned in
connection with the exercise of wisdom. In the Lawh-I-Maqsud,
Bahá'u'lláh discusses the way in which the learned should
"impart guidance unto the people."39
"No man of wisdom," He asserts, "can demonstrate
his knowledge save by means of words." "Moreover,"
He continues, "words and utterances should be both
impressive and penetrating. However, no word will be infused with
these two qualities unless it be uttered wholly for the sake of
God and with due regard unto the exigencies of the occasion and
the people." Bahá'u'lláh goes on to say, Every word is
endowed with a spirit, therefore the speaker or expounder should
deliver his words at the appropriate time and place, for the
impression which each word maketh is clearly evident and
perceptible. . . .One word may be likened unto fire, another unto
light, and the influence of both is manifest in the world.
Therefore, an enlightened man of wisdom should primarily speak
with words as mild as milk, that the children of men may be
nurtured and edified thereby and may attain the ultimate goal of
human existence . . . It behoveth the prudent man of wisdom to
speak with utmost leniency and forbearance so that the sweetness
of his words may induce everyone to attain that which befitteth
man's station.40
Elsewhere in the same Tablet Bahá'u'lláh reiterates the
connection of wisdom with tolerance. He says, "The heaven of
divine wisdom is illumined with the two luminaries of
consultation and compassion"41 and elsewhere,
"The heaven of true understanding shineth resplendent with
the light of two luminaries: tolerance and righteousness."42This
Tablet suggests that a number of factors should be considered
when judging the "wisdom" of our work. First and
foremost is our purpose; is our work done for the sake of God or
are other motives in operation? Secondly, we must consider our
audience. To whom do we address our work and under what
circumstances? Finally we must consider our tone, is it
reflective of the forbearance, tolerance, and compassion which
Bahá'u'lláh urges us to exhibit? Is it conveyed in such a
spirit as to be conducive of further discourse and consultation?
I propose no easy answers to the dilemma imposed upon the scholar
who strives to adhere both to the standards of wisdom and truth.
Observing wisdom' and the independent investigation of truth' are
both principles enjoined by Bahá'u'lláh. But two things must be
kept in mind in connection with this issue. First wisdom, when it
involves a temporary suspension of a Bahá'í principle, must be
always regarded as an emergency measure which should cease once
the circumstances which created it no longer operate. Secondly,
wisdom, as I have established, carries with it the connotation of
farsightedness. Acts accord with wisdom, not to the extent to
which they make the friends feel comfortable, but to the extent
to which they further the Cause of God in the long term. In this
respect, it must be recognized that many actions Bahá'ís have
taken in the name of hikmat proved to be short-sighted indeed.
Consider again the case of the Jewish Bahá'ís of Hamadan who in
the name of hikmat pretended to become Presbyterians. This action
aroused the antagonism of Dr. Sa'id Khan, a Kurdish convert to
Christianity. Convinced by the duplicity of those Bahá'ís that
the Bahá'í Faith was a religion based on deception, he went on
to collect as much dirt' on the Cause as he could. The material
he collected was eventually turned over to Rev. William McElwee
Miller and became the basis of his two books attacking the Faith.43Even
those missionaries who, unlike Miller, had no investment in
converting others came to see the Bahá'ís as a people without
integrity. Some of these, such as T. Cuyler Young, when on to
become eminent scholars in America and their attitudes have
spread to academicians throughout the country. I could name
several other cases, much more recent than the one cited, where
prominent persons have rejected the Cause as a result of actions
taken and policies made in the name of hikmat. Bahá'ís must
exercise constant vigilance to insure that hikmat not be used to
obtain short-term gains or avoid immediate conflicts without
considering its long-term consequences. Such actions are, in
fact, contrary to wisdom.
Notes
1. My thanks to Dr. Nader Saiedi for bringing this distinction
between sophia and phronesis to my attention. For Aristotle's
treatment see The Nicomachean Ethics 1140a24-1142b12.
2. Unpublished compilation, National Archives Committee, no.
28, p.179. Cited in Taherzadeh, The Revelation of Bahá'u'lláh
vol. 4, p. 321.
3. Ibid. no. 15, pp. 423-24.
4. Shoghi Effendi, Bahá'í Administration, (Wilmette: 1974),
p. 63. That censorship is contrary to Bahá'í principles is
underscored by Bahá'u'lláh's prohibition against the
destruction or burning of books in the Kitab-I Aqdas, (Haifa:
Universal House of Justice, 1992), p. 48.
5. Adib Taherzadeh, The Revelation of Bahá'u'lláh, Vol. 4,
p. 320.
6. Early studies on the Iranian "character" have
been reviewed and critiqued in Ali Banuazizi, "Iranian
'National Character': A Critique of Some Western
Perspectives," in Psychological Dimensions of Near Eastern
Studies, eds. L. Carl Brown and Norman Itzkowitz (Princeton:
Darwin Press, 1977), pp, 210-39. Later studies stress the
flexibility of Iranian social interactions. See William 0.
Beeman, "Status, Style and Strategy in Iranian
interactions," Anthropological Linguistics, 18 (1976),
305-22.
7. Qur'an 16:106.
8. Marshall G. S. Hodgson, The Venture of Islam, Vol. 2, p.
194.
9. Ibid., pp. 199-200.
10. Bahá'u'lláh, Gleanings from the Writings of
Bahá'u'lláh, p. 343.
11. Tablets of Bahá'u'lláh, pp. 212-3.
12. Majmu'a-yi Alwah-I Mubaraka (Wilmette: Bahá'í Publishing
Trust, 1981) p. 226.
13. Tablets of Bahá'u'lláh, p. 256.
14. Tablets of Bahá'u'lláh, p. 143.
15. Ma'idih-I Asmani vol. 7, p. 171. My thanks to Dr. Juan
Cole and Dr. Ahang Rabbani for bringing this Tablet to my
attention and assisting me in gaining access to it.
16. Ibid.
17. Ibid. p. 172.
18. Hidden Words (Wilmette: Bahá'í Publishing Trust, 1990)
pp. 34-35.
19. Muhammad Tahir Malmari, Tarikh-I-Shuhaday-I-Yazd, p.
30-34.
20. Malmari, p. 59.
21. Ruhu'u'llah Mihrabkhani, Sharhi Ahval-I Jinab-I
Abu'l-Fadl-I Gulpaygani (Teheran, 1976), pp. 129-30.
22. J. R. Richards, The Religion of the Bahá'ís, (New York:
Macmillian, 1932) pp. 235-6.
23. In Iran today persons wishing to leave the country by
plane must sign a form stating that they are not Bahá'ís.
Bahá'í institutions, therefore, have regarded Bahá'ís who
left Iran by the Tehran airport as apostates.
24. Shoghi Effendi, The World Order of Bahá'u'lláh,
(Wilmette: 1969), p. 35. This is one of the few instances where
Shoghi Effendi applies the term "unwisdom" to
non-Bahá'ís. He also applies it to Kaiser Wilhelm II for his
dismissal of Bismarck. The Promised Day is Come, pp. 57-58.
25. Bahá'u'lláh, The Seven Valleys and the Four Valleys,
(Wilmette: 1976), p. 12.
26. 'Abdu'l-Bahá, Will and Testament, p. 11.
27. Wellspring of Guidance, Messages, 1963-1968, Wilmette:
Bahá'í Publishing Trust, 1969, p. 82.
28. "Exalted, immensely exalted is He Who hath removed
differences and established harmony. Glorified, infinitely
glorified is He who hath caused discord to cease, and decreed
solidarity and unity. Praised be God, the Pen of the Most High
hath lifted distinctions from between His servants and
handmaidens and, through His consummate favours and
all-encompassing mercy, hath conferred upon all a station and
rank on the same plane. He hath broken the back of vain
imaginings with the sword of utterance and hath obliterated the
perils of idle fancies through the pervasive power of His
might." Bahá'u'lláh from Women, compiled by the Research
Department of the Universal House of Justice, (Oakham: 1986) p.
1.
29. Selections from the Writings of 'Abdu'l-Bahá, (Haifa:
1976), p. 80.
30. Cited in the May 31, 1988 letter of the Universal House of
Justice to the National Spiritual Assembly of the Bahá'ís of
New Zealand.
31. Women, p. 5. Iranian women finally received the right to
hold office in 1954.
32. Cited in Introduction to The Kitab-i-Aqdas: The Most Holy
Book, p. 6.
33. Ibid., [paragraph] 63.
34. Mazandarani, Fadil, Amr va Khalq, vol. 4, (Tihran:
1974/5-131 B.E.), pp. 175-76.
35. Kitab-i-Aqdas, p. 206.
36.The Guardian's secretary wrote on his behalf:
"Regarding Bahá'í marriage: in the light of the Master's
Tablet interpreting the provision in the "Aqdas" on the
subject of theplurality of wives, it becomes evident that
monogamy alone is permissible, and monogamy alone should be
practiced." Cited in The Synopsis and Codification of the
Kitab-i-Aqdas, (Haifa: Bahá'í World Centre, 1973), Note 17, p.
59.
37. Memorandum from the Research Department to the Universal
House of Justice 27 June 1996. My thanks to Milissa Boyer for
providing me with a copy of this document. Most of my discussion
of the issue of bigamy is based on it.
38. Kitab-I-Iqan, p. 192.
39. Tablets of Bahá'u'lláh, p. 172.
40. Ibid., pp.172-72.
41. Ibid., p. 168.
42. Ibid., pp. 169-70.
43. William McElwee Miller, Bahá'ísm. Its Origin, History,
and Teachings (Fleming H. Revell Co. , 1931) William McElwee
Miller, The Bahá'í Faith: Its History and Teachings (South
Pasadena: William Carey Library, 1974). For biographical
information on Dr. Sa'id Khan see Isaac Malek Yonan, The Beloved
Physician of Teheran (Nashville: Cokesbury Press, 1934) and
William McElwee Miller, Ten Muslims Meet Christ, pp. 33-48.
Copyright Susan Stiles Maneck
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